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Russia, the Baltic States, and East-West Relations in Europe

GEORGE W. BRESLAUER

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GEORGE W. BRESLAUER *

* University of California at Berkeley

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Introduction[1]

This paper places Russian-Baltic relations within the context of Moscow's policies toward East-West relations in general and toward Europe in particular. It analyzes the thrust of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin and the observable implications this has had for the Baltic states. It then suggests alternative scenarios for the future of Russia's domestic evolution, the implications of those scenarios for its foreign relations, and the consequences of each for Moscow's relations with the Baltic states.

The paper is cast at a fairly high level of generalization. It does not analyze the twists and turns of Moscow's daily relations with the Baltic states in recent years. And it is not based on new research into the issue; hence, the informational base of this "think piece" will be familiar to specialists on Russian foreign relations. Rather, I provide a general framework within which to locate the current, fairly temperate Russo-Baltic relations. And I discuss the conditions under which flashpoints could arise in the relationship or a sustained heightening of hostility might take place.

Three Foreign Policy Tendencies

One can distinguish many fine gradations among the orientations and preferences of different political actors in Moscow. But, basically, there have been three coherent tendencies competing for ascendancy in Russian foreign policymaking since 1991: liberal internationalism, radical nationalism, and moderate nationalism.[2] Each of them has historical roots, but each has been adapted to post-Soviet conditions at home and in the world.

Liberal-internationalism is a term that has its origins in Western international relations theory; its initial application was to Western countries. Its counterpart in Soviet days was the radical reformist, and at times "globalist" tendency that became stronger behind the scenes throughout the post-Stalin decades and that eventuated in Gorbachev's "new thinking" about international relations.[3] In late-Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, it entailed the formal rejection of proletarian internationalism and class conflict in international affairs in favor of the Westernization of Russia and its integration into European, Atlantic, and global-capitalist economic, political, and military institutions. This was a perspective that called for "joining the West" as a co-resident of "our common home - Europe". Sometimes proponents of this perspective extended it to encompass the Atlantic dimension as well: "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" (traveling from West to East, of course). The tendency viewed Europe as a more

advanced civilization - indeed, as the standard for "civilized, normal" society - and as a reference group for emulation by Russia as it attempted to redefine itself.[4]

This tendency dominated Gorbachev's foreign policy, though it was tempered by a strained effort to maintain certain distinctive features of Soviet "socialism" that would provide the basis for a democratic-socialist "third way". That strained effort was dropped after the Soviet Union collapsed. During the first year of Yeltsin's presidency of independent Russia, liberal internationalism prevailed in Moscow's foreign policymaking. Essentially, this meant that Russian policymakers were eager to cooperate with the United States and Western Europe largely on the West's terms, in hopes of securing material assistance for the transition and of rapidly integrating Russia into as many Western-led multilateral organizations as possible.

Reacting in part against this concessionary, supplicant posture, and in part against the simultaneous collapse of the USSR, communism, the Warsaw Pact, and Soviet global power, a rejectionist counter-tendency emerged rapidly during 1992-1993. Sometimes referred to as a "red-brown" coalition, it united restorationist communists with reactionary and romantic nationalists. Differences within the coalition over the desirability or feasibility of restoring the USSR were less important than the common sentiment: that Russia must restore its prior glory and stand up against the dark forces in the outside world that are trying to destroy it. Let us call this tendency, following Shlapentokh,[5] *radical nationalist*, while bearing in mind that it includes many imperial restorationists as well.

This counter-tendency is based upon the search for a unique path of development for Russia and a unique role for Russia internationally. It rejects the goal of integrating the country into Europe, for it treats Russia as surrounded by enemies on all fronts.[6] It provides the ideological foundation for a neo-fascist regime in Russia; it is what we would have to fear if "Weimar Russia" proves to be a prophetic metaphor for the Russia of tomorrow. In foreign policy prescriptions, the tendency can take many forms, distinguished by the scope and focus of its use of violence. It can be isolationist and focus its promotion of violence on internal enemies, both political and ethnic. Alternatively, it can be imperial-restorationist, thus exercising large-scale coercion against countries of the Near Abroad. Or it can also express itself in aggressive expansion beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, whether coupled with, or instead of, an imperial-restorationist project. In any case, the posture toward the outside world would be decidedly confrontational. Happily, radical nationalism has been only a rhetorical tendency in Russian

political and social circles thus far, though it has certainly influenced the climate of opinion in Moscow.[7]

The third tendency stands midway between the liberal-internationalist and the radical-nationalist. Again following Shlapentokh,[8] let us call it *moderate nationalism*.[9] This perspective rejects as excessively one-sided the concessionary terms of cooperation with the West accepted under Gorbachev and during the first year of Yeltsin's leadership. But it equally rejects the view of Russia as besieged by hostile international forces that it must confront in order to deter; and it resists the temptation to embrace coercively restorationist projects. Rather, "moderate nationalism" seeks to combine cooperation with competition in international affairs. It views Russia as, by right, a great European power, one that wishes cooperation with Europe, even integration into European institutions, but accompanied by a special sensitivity to the maintenance of its sovereignty, autonomy, and special, great-power status. In domestic affairs, the moderate nationalists tend to be technocratic and pragmatic. In foreign relations, they are self-styled "realists", embracing balance-of-power, *realpolitik* theories of international life.

Moderate nationalists lack idealism about international affairs and fear that liberal internationalism, as practiced earlier, is willy-nilly a prescription for being suckered by a United States that is seeking hegemony within the global system. Many of them, when forced to define their positions in ideational or identity-driven terms, embrace some variant of "Eurasianism", which seeks a distinctive identity for Russia in international affairs as a bridge between Europe and Asia due to its unique combination of both heritages. But, when discussing concrete policies, the Eurasian identity is less important than the pragmatic search for ways simultaneously to cooperate with the West, build advantageous relations with other powers throughout the world, offset US unilateralism, and define a set of foreign policy interests that are distinctive to Russia and for which it is willing to stand up. The moderate-nationalist tendency came to the fore in 1993, in a reaction against the liberal-internationalism then ascendant, expressing itself as an analytical challenge: what is Russia's "national interest"?[10] The tendency has been getting stronger ever since, to the point that many former liberal internationalists shifted their position toward moderate nationalism. As a result, and unlike the radical nationalist tendency, the moderate-nationalist tendency has emerged ascendant within the policy-making community.

Margot Light has nicely summarized some of the points of complementary and difference among these three tendencies.

"Both Liberal Westernizers and Pragmatic Nationalists stressed the importance of relations with the West, [...] although they differed in the priority and exclusivity they accorded to these relations. Similarly, both Pragmatic and Fundamentalist Nationalists expressed Eurasianist views. The distinction between them with regard to Eurasia lay primarily in how they envisaged implementing their ideas. All three groups also agreed that Russia was responsible for the welfare of Russians in the diaspora. They different, however, about what the Russian government should do to fulfil its obligations....All three groups insisted that Russia was, and would continue to be, a great power. They differed, however, on what the implications of great- power status were for Russian foreign policy".[11]

Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Strategy: A Synthesis

In contrast to Moscow's policies of 1988-1992, Russian foreign policy since 1993 has reflected an effort to *combine* the liberal-internationalist and the moderate-nationalist tendencies. The embattlement of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and his eventual replacement in January 1996 by Yevgeny Primakov, were surface manifestations of this effort to strike a balance - or to effect what Wallender has called a "liberal-statist synthesis".[12] The effort to combine competitive (but not confrontational) with cooperative postures accounts for the continuing urge for cooperation with the West as well as the strain placed on cooperation by the simultaneous urge to define and defend Russia's national pride and to assert national interests independent of Western concerns. The latter has expressed itself in self-assertion within the Near Abroad, the development of closer ties with regimes such as Iran and Iraq that affect Russia's security and material interests, efforts to balance US unilateralism through expanded ties with China and India, adoption of a limited protector role toward Serbia in the NATO-Yugoslavia confrontation, problematic arms control negotiations, and others. The tension within the coalition also explains Moscow's urge both to be integrated into Europe and to do so in ways that do not make Russia simply an instrument of Washington's foreign policy preferences.

But in both the liberal-internationalist and the moderate-nationalist worldviews, the "idea of Europe" is both strong and positive: as a reference group in international and domestic affairs, as a partner, as an object of emulation, and as a community of which Russia would like to be a part.[13] And for the large majority of policy influentials, the idea of East-West and Russo-European cooperation is equally powerful, viewed as both desirable in its own right and as necessary for the stabilization of both a dangerous international environment and an increasingly out-of-control domestic Russian context.[14]

What, then, are the implications of these tendencies for Russian foreign policy toward the Baltic states? We have seen, under Yeltsin, how the two tendencies have combined to shape policy in that region. Moscow has proven willing to withdraw its troops from bases in the Baltic states and to dismantle advanced military installations, but tried to link the pace of withdrawal, rhetorically at least, to liberalization of Baltic states' citizenship laws. As it turned out, Moscow withdrew the troops and dismantled the installations, and Latvia and Estonia made concessions by revising their citizenship laws. Similarly, we find in Moscow's official rhetoric and discussions a resigned acceptance of the Baltics as having escaped the Russian sphere of influence.[15] But we also find an insistence that the treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltic states is a legitimate ethno-national concern of Moscow's, that access to Kaliningrad is a legitimate national-security concern, and that Moscow has the right as well as the means to exercise material coercion, given Baltic dependence on Russian energy supplies, if the Baltic states reject Moscow's right to express and act upon its concerns. Then too, we have witnessed Russian willingness to endorse prospective Baltic integration into the European Union, but accompanied by a heightened sensitivity to Russian exclusion from EU institutions and strong opposition to the idea of Baltic membership in NATO.[16] In sum, Moscow's policies toward the Baltic states have mirrored the combination of cooperation and competition in its approach to Russo-European and East-West relations more generally.

The liberal-statist synthesis is not driven solely by generalized worldviews, however. An especially powerful set of private economic interests has arisen since the collapse of communism and has become assertive as an actor in the formulation of Russian policies since the mid-1990s. The energy industry - LUKoil and Gazprom in particular - has sought opportunities and concessions in all three Baltic states. Temporary deterioration of Moscow's relations with each state in 1998 and 1999 coincided with efforts by these conglomerates to win concessions from Baltic governments.[17] But, after those companies succeeded in their efforts, relations between Moscow and the Baltic governments returned to a state of relative equilibrium.[18]

A Stable Equilibrium?

Despite the tensions within the liberal/moderate-nationalist coalition, this has proven to be a fairly stable equilibrium. During the past six years, variations within Moscow's policy repertoire toward the Baltic States have stayed within the parameters I have outlined. Those parameters have been reinforced by the European Union's and the Council of Europe's attitudes toward citizenship laws

and minorities' rights in the Baltic states - attitudes that dovetailed with what Moscow had been advocating.

But the stability of the equilibrium has also been mightily reinforced by one common characteristic of advocates of both the liberal-internationalist and moderate-nationalist tendencies in Moscow. Most of them are supremely aware of Russia's current, and likely continuing, *weakness* as a state and as an actor in international affairs. This is not a matter of attitudes and preferences; it is a matter of rational calculation and perception. These may be at variance with ideal preferences and with nostalgia for great power status. And that variance may leave individuals highly conflicted and frustrated, inclining them toward angry rhetorical outbursts at academic conferences, at press conferences, and in some publications. But the realistic awareness of Russia's *capabilities* has been, and remains, a powerful source of sobriety within the process of formulating Russia's foreign policy - one that existed already in 1992 but that was greatly reinforced by the traumatic military defeat in Chechnya.[19] In the actual formulation of policy, pessimism has prevailed about Russia's capability to assert itself as a great power and about its ability to close the gap between ideal preferences and realistic capabilities. It is noteworthy, for example, that, on many issues, Moscow's foreign policy establishment (though perhaps not its parliament) has been willing to compromise and conciliate Western capitals when forced to choose between a cooperative and a competitive posture.[20]

Perhaps the pithiest expression of the gap between nostalgia and sober calculation, or between affect and cognition, was stated by Aleksandr Lebed - a moderate nationalist - in his autobiography. The statement concerned the Near Abroad and was appropriated without attribution by Boris Yeltsin in his presidential campaign of 1996: "Those who do not regret the collapse of the USSR lack a heart; those who believe they can restore it in its previous form lack a brain".[21] Lebed expressed similarly moderate thoughts during a visit to NATO headquarters in Fall 1996, where he spoke about the prospect of NATO's first wave of expansion.[22]

Having said this, however, we must bear in mind some important caveats, even if the current, liberal-statist synthesis remains ascendant in Moscow. For one thing, one can exaggerate Russia's weakness. For another thing, one can exaggerate the extent to which rational calculation will repeatedly be the basis for policymaking.

Sources of Disruption of the Equilibrium

As far as strength and weakness are concerned, power is a relative, situational, and perceptual concept. Russia may be weak in general, and awareness of this weakness may currently shape the general direction of its foreign policy. But in specific realms and places, Russia may enjoy sources of leverage that give it bargaining power in interstate relations.

In the Baltics, Russia has economic sources of leverage in its control of energy supplies, although, admittedly, it is also dependent on the Baltics as transit routes for oil exports and many imports. Thus, in deference to the demands of LUKoil, Russia successfully imposed economic sanctions on Latvia and Lithuania in early 1998 and early 1999, respectively.[23] Russia also has military sources of leverage, especially with respect to covert operations. Russian policymakers have political sources of leverage to encourage ethnic-Russian residents of Latvia and Estonia to politicize and dramatize their grievances. They have psychological sources of leverage in the very fact that Russia is so big, so close, so unstable, and historically so rapacious, lending magnitude as well as credibility to Russian rhetorical threats. And they have ecological sources of leverage in their capacity to ignore situations that may have drastic environmental consequences for that region. These specific forms of leverage, of course, do not ensure the capacity for ongoing domination, much less restoration. And the exercise of some of them could have an adverse impact on Russia's relations with Western Europe and the United States - a cost that policymakers of the liberal and moderate-nationalist orientation in Moscow would consider seriously before acting. Hence, they would not be exercised lightly. But if our concern is the measurement of Russian weakness or strength, the point to bear in mind is that these sources of leverage can be important in a crisis, that they could be sources of strength, not weakness, in the given situation (Russian-Baltic relations), and that they could offset the general perception of weakness among policymakers in Moscow.

Similarly, the assumption of rational calculation can be offset by circumstances. Periodic flashpoints between Moscow and Baltic governments could exacerbate relations, even while a coalition of liberals and moderate-nationalists rules in Moscow. These could be a product of circumstances within the Baltic states or within Russia. In the Baltic countries, while great progress has been made toward economic and political revival, the unresolved questions of inter-ethnic relations and national identity could hit the surface in ugly ways, especially when economic rough-patches are hit or economic shocks take place. The current economic condition of the Czech Republic reminds us that economic progress after communism, even in the best of cases, is unlikely to be

linear. Moreover, the unsettled condition of Russian politics, the fragmented condition of the Russian state, and the inherent tensions and contradictions within an approach to foreign policy that tries to combine competitive with cooperative premises suggest that Moscow's policies are not always likely to be dictated by sober calculation of interests and capacities.

We can imagine a number of ways this could happen. First, the Baltics could become a scapegoat for Russian frustration in other realms of internal or foreign policy. If the Russian competitive tendency in places like the Caspian region, Iraq, Yugoslavia, or Iran is being deterred or effectively countered, either by Western counteraction or local circumstances, a ruling group could look elsewhere for a compensatory gain that is less likely to be countered effectively. Second, one could think, not of a ruling group, but of a political leader who is seeking to defend his shaken authority. As Lebow has shown in the case of great power crises of the 19th and 20th centuries, when leaders are on the political defensive, they often seek "wins" by militarist means that they would not have entertained had their authority been secure.[24] Such an interpretation could be applied to Khrushchev's emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It may also explain the fact that Boris Yeltsin was willing to invade Chechnya only five years after his country had finally extricated itself from the war in Afghanistan, and less than three years after Yeltsin himself had severed Russian material assistance to the successor Afghan government. Yeltsin was decidedly on the political defensive at the time.[25]

A third path toward the same end is also rooted in the pathological side-effects of political competition. During political campaigns and in anticipation of political succession, candidates typically strike postures that they hope will resonate with their electoral audiences. Since there are more politicians competing for positions than there are defensible programmatic niches within a liberal-statist policy synthesis, politicians will be tempted to competitively outbid each other to attract voters who are disaffected either materially or ideologically: with promises of personal-economic relief or national-economic betterment or with promises to restore Russia's glory by one means or another. Competitive outbidding in Russian politics also means the search for scapegoats - and scapegoating of the Baltics is easy, since they are small and weak. Moreover, it is potentially less costly to treat the Baltics as the *rhetorical* whipping boys than to target the governments of Ukraine or Kazakhstan - assuming the competing politicians are primarily concerned to maintain stability at home and to avert destabilization of these two large neighbors.

As long as scapegoating of the Baltics remains rhetorical, it may trigger no escalatory dynamic. But one can imagine an escalatory path of the following

sort. A candidate is elected who had scapegoated the Baltics during the election campaign and feels the need politically, at a minimum, to demonstrate some progress on that score after she is in office. Baltic governments then react to this apparent provocation by upping the rhetorical ante, as a way of drawing the United States and Western Europe into an augmented commitment to their protection, which in turn leads to an escalation of real Russian threats. Someone would likely back down, since neither the US, Western Europe, nor Russia under a liberal/moderate-nationalist coalition wants an East-West confrontation. But the dynamic could nonetheless exacerbate relations and, depending on the outcome, potentially undercut the credibility of liberals and moderate nationalists within Russian politics.

Note again that all three of these triggers of possible toughening of Moscow's policies toward the Baltics can take place under a liberal/moderate-nationalist coalition and are consistent with a more general self-perception of Russia as a weak power.

There is another path to exacerbation of Russo-Baltic relations under these same conditions. The current Russian state is fragmented and corrupted throughout. That condition can be the source of provocations that are not orchestrated by either a ruling group or a president or foreign minister in Moscow. Russian military commanders in Moscow or in regions adjacent to the Baltic states may not share the moderation of the politicians in the ruling coalition. Given the tragic condition of Russia's armed forces, those commanders may be more emotional about issues such as the miserable conditions in Kaliningrad and Murmansk. Given Russia's small number of warm water ports, the same commanders may be more convinced that the Baltics are strategically vital to Russia's national security. Affectively and cognitively, such commanders may differ enough from their civilian bosses that, in a crisis, they might be willing to undertake independent actions that could escalate the crisis unnecessarily. Similarly, one can imagine provocations by uncontrolled Russian expatriate forces within the Baltic states or by local police or paramilitary organizations in regions adjacent to the Baltic states. That is, without coordination with politicians or commanders in Moscow or St. Petersburg, these forces, in a crisis or in "normal" times, could seek to elevate Moscow's commitment to their cause by initiating a crisis between themselves and Baltic governmental authorities and by then calling upon Moscow to protect them against the reaction.

With the reconsolidation of authoritarianism in Belarus, and Moscow's support for growing integration between Russia, Belarus, and others, one can imagine still another path through which provocations could upset normality in

Russo-Baltic relations. An unpredictable, imperial-restorationist president in Belarus - such as the current president, Aleksandr Lukashenko - could find it convenient to distract attention from domestic conditions in that country by fabricating crises with his Baltic neighbors. And given his increased influence in Moscow, and relative obliviousness to Western governmental opinions, he could feel emboldened to do so with relative impunity.

All of which suggests a policy prescription. Baltic governments might be wise to increase their levels of integration, not only with Scandinavia and north-central Europe, but also with Russia's northwest region and the Leningrad *oblast'* in particular. To the extent that such integration fostered greater local-Russian dependence on Baltic assets, it could create an additional constituency in Moscow for moderation and cooperation. Hopefully, this would raise Moscow's threshold for competitive or confrontational responses to crises born of provocations. From this perspective, recent Baltic humanitarian assistance to Kalinigrad *oblast'* was salutary and wise.

NATO Enlargement and the War in Yugoslavia

The paths to crisis noted above would not require overthrow (or fundamental radicalization) of the coalition of liberals and moderate nationalists in Moscow. But an alternative path to crisis runs through Western Europe, NATO, and the United States and would likely entail a more fundamental shift. This hypothetical path is triggered by the combination of NATO's first wave of expansion, that organization's war in Yugoslavia, and the prospect of a second wave of NATO expansion that accorded membership to one or more of the Baltic States. Within the confines of this essay I cannot discuss all the issues and contingencies associated with these past, present, and future events. But several points warrant emphasis. One lesson of the first wave of enlargement, which entailed membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, is that the vast majority of Russian politicians of all political orientations considered NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe to be a very undesirable development.[26] Responses ranged along a spectrum from viewing it as simply unfortunate, insensitive, or unhelpful (the response of the most pro-Western, liberal internationalists) to viewing it as an aggressive, hostile act of isolation and encirclement of Russia (the radical-nationalist response). Most politicians stood at points in between in their rhetoric, though with a bias toward emotional rhetoric and the imputation to NATO of hostile intent. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 marginally offset this emotion and perception and certainly facilitated President Boris Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov's efforts to prevent the inevitable outcome from destroying the fabric

of Russo-American and Russo-European governmental relations. But the fact that years of Russian protests did so little to prevent that outcome must certainly have affected the climate of opinion in Moscow regarding Western intentions. It would be useful to know just how much of Russia's forebearance in reacting against NATO enlargement was due to restraint enforced by Boris Yeltsin and how much reflected a broader consensus within Moscow's policymaking circles about policy priorities, avoidance of adventurism, and the limits of the possible.

Although difficult to document, NATO enlargement likely had a corrosive effect on the credibility of the ruling coalition's justifications for moderation. And it forced many politicians and intellectuals to swallow a great deal of anger and disillusionment. If all other things had remained equal, the behavioral consequences might not have become apparent for quite some time, but could have manifested themselves, perhaps quite unexpectedly, at some point in the future. As Nikolai Sokov wrote in July 1998:

> "Russian policy is likely to be stable for a long time, marked by explosions of strong rhetoric, but restraint in terms of action. If tension continues to build, however, policy is likely to snap at an unpredictable moment, perhaps with little apparent provocation. Russia's external relations will be guided by emotion instead of rational calculation [...]. So far Russia has not truly reacted to NATO enlargement. The real response might come years from now, and is impossible to predict. To a large degree, it will be formed by the way the relationship with NATO develops in the next several years. Historical patterns warn that Russia, while appearing to drop its grievances, may at some point suddenly demand 'payment' for events everyone else will have forgotten".[27]

Obviously, the Baltic states are relevant to the matter of "the way the relationship with NATO develops in the next several years". The logic of piecemeal NATO enlargement entailed a felt need in the West to reassure those countries that had been left out but that were knocking vigorously at the doors. Rhetorically, Western governments provided this reassurance by proclaiming that enlargement is a continuing process, that no country in Europe is excluded from the possibility of eventual membership, and that the Baltic states stand a good chance of consideration when the next wave of accessions is considered seriously. To make those assurances credible, representatives of Western governments would occasionally state or hint that the timetable for consideration might be accelerated.

None of this public discussion, of course, reassured Russian politicians and policy-makers, who have been warning continuously that a second wave of enlargement which incorporated states of the former Soviet Union would entail "consequences". Nor is it clear that concrete reassurances to Russia, beyond

those already to be found in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, could be devised that would defuse Russian concerns. For the Baltics, while written off by Moscow's policy-makers as potential participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States, remain much more closely tied into the Russian policy-making "psyche" than are the states of the former Warsaw Pact. Psychologically, integration of part of the FSU into a potentially hostile alliance structure evokes loss of empire, loss of great power status, a historical mindset of Russia being abused by the outside world, and a deep resentment of American unilateralism since the end of the Cold War. Politically, it evokes the ethnic Russian communities that would suddenly be living under NATO's prospective protection. Militarily, it evokes the loss of a major defense perimeter and its "occupation" by a former enemy alliance. And emotionally, it evokes all the anger and sense of helplessness that have accumulated over the past ten years of precipitous decline of their country. Obviously, even for those Russian elites who are most oriented toward cooperation with the West, expansion of NATO into the Baltic states would be a difficult pill to swallow.

Much of Moscow's problem with NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe was that Western governments were attempting to transform an alliance against a common enemy into a security community for stabilization of the continent, but without diminishing the military preparedness of an alliance. NATO enlargement *is* defensible, in principle at least, as an effort to use the alliance as an instrument of all-European stabilization. Indeed, the prospect and hope for NATO membership has led several governments in Eastern Europe to settle major differences between their states, and has influenced the governments of Latvia and Estonia to liberalize their citizenship laws. Authorities in Moscow acknowledged that an all-European organization for collective security, broadly defined, was a salutary prospect. They questioned, however, the choice of organization, since NATO is the one all-European organization in which Russia has had no realistic prospect of gaining membership.

Russian commentators repeatedly stressed that Moscow must evaluate the "threat" from NATO enlargement by asking questions about the long term. Why does the West consider NATO, and not the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the West European Union, or some hypothetical new organization to be the most appropriate instrument for creating a pan-European security community? What is the vision in the West of the role of Russia within this security community in, say, the year 2030? Will Russia be a member of equal standing in policy-making processes within the community? If NATO is the instrument of choice, what are the prospects that Russia will also be drawn into membership? Will Baltic countries have a presumptive veto over the acceptance of new members, as the

NATO rules of unanimity currently imply? Since Moscow never received reassuring or convincing answers to these questions, it is not surprising that it drew the conclusion that, in 30 years, NATO expansion throughout Eastern Europe and into the Baltic states (and perhaps also into Belarus and Ukraine) could erect a new political "curtain" between Russia - even a democratic Russia - and Europe.[28]

Thus, even for those many Russian politicians who believed that NATO and NATO expansion presented no real military threat to their country, the idea of a NATO enlargement that excluded the realistic possibility of Russian membership implied heightened barriers to Russia's long-term goal of integrating itself into Europe. And, again thinking about the long term, so many twists of fate and history could intercede in that time period that an expanded NATO could easily be reconverted into an anti-Russian defense alliance, especially given the anti-Russian proclivities of almost all the new and prospective members. If those members included states of the former Soviet Union, the next Cold War, if it came to that, could leave Russia in a decidedly worse position militarily and politically than it had *circa* 1985.

Moreover, just as Lyndon Johnson, in 1963, conceded defeat in Laos but promised that South Vietnam would not fall, so Russian leaders conceded defeat on the first wave of NATO expansion but promised that accession of Baltic states would not be accepted without more of a fight. It is possible that this was bluff, though it proved not to be in the case of Lyndon Johnson. And it is worth bearing in mind that such "never again" rhetoric creates both psychological and political pressure to deliver on one's threats. For many reasons, then, unreflective or undercompensated expansion of NATO into the Baltic region could trigger a real crisis in Russo-European-American relations and markedly influence the balance of forces in Moscow between moderate-nationalist and radical-nationalist sentiments.

For all these reasons, the dominant coalition in Moscow followed the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 with an immediate effort to slow the momentum toward Baltic accession during a second wave. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in September 1997, proposed "confidence-building measures designed to ease tensions in the Baltic region [and] called for the Baltic states to adopt a non-bloc status similar to that of Finland and Sweden and said that Russia was ready to offer the Baltic states (and Sweden and Finland) unilateral security guarantees". Russia found no takers for these offers.[29]

Just as Moscow was accommodating itself to the *fait accompli* of Polish, Czech, and Hungarian accession to NATO, while drawing its "red line" against

a second wave of NATO expansion, war broke out between NATO and Milosevic's Yugoslavia. The effect of this war was to greatly increase the credibility and legitimacy of anti-NATO sentiments within the Russian population, to shift the balance in elite rhetoric toward a combination of moderate- and radical-nationalist sentiments, and to throw liberal-internationalists into a state of political helplessness. The fact that the war happened to be waged against a historical Russian ally and ethno-religious associate heightened the sense of rage. But more fundamental was the fact that the war took place against Russia's will and without United Nations sanction (to avoid a Russian or Chinese veto). This suggested to policy-makers in Moscow that NATO had unilaterally declared itself to be the guardian of values in Europe, with the right to enforce its will militarily on the continent as it so chose. The net effect was both to greatly strengthen anti-Western sentiments and fears within the populace and political elite and to reinforce the presumption that NATO would attempt to dictate to Moscow the terms of Russia's prospective integration into Europe.

President Yeltsin and his foreign policy establishment, including special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, have attempted to salvage the liberal-internationalist component of Russian foreign policy by trying to broker a diplomatic end to the war and a settlement of the Kosovo tragedy. Their efforts continue as of this writing (May 21, 1999), as does NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia and the venomous rhetoric it unleashed in Russia. The immediate future is therefore inherently unpredictable. A successfully brokered end to the war, including a major Russian role in keeping the peace, could salvage the strength of liberal-internationalism in Russia's foreign policy-making. A brokerage that also resulted in the adoption of proposals for restructuring NATO to include Russia formally in a Euro-Atlantic command, could strengthen the liberal-internationalist component.[30] But an unsuccessful brokerage could discredit liberal internationalism and shift Moscow's foreign policy toward a coalition of moderate and radical nationalists, with moderation-in-policy dictated only by a shared sense of Russia's weaknesses. Under such circumstances, Russian policy-makers of this orientation could still make life unpleasant for the West by refusing to cooperate in combating common environmental, military, and other threats. Or they could seek to compensate for Russian setbacks in Europe by becoming more assertive and coercive in relations with the Baltic States and with selected Commonwealth states. Consolidation of neo-imperial relations in the Near Abroad would be consistent with prevailing sentiments among both moderate- and radical-nationalists.

Whether this will happen is inherently unpredictable. Much may depend on the outcome of the Duma elections scheduled for December 1999 and the

presidential elections scheduled for June 2000. If the political rhetoric of those electoral campaigns is strongly tinged by anti-Westernism, and if those forces emerge victorious, we may have the unwelcome opportunity to learn whether moderation in Russian foreign policy has thus far been more a product of Yeltsin's preferences or of a broadly-based, rational calculation of Russia's weakness. Under a Luzhkov, Zyuganov, Lebed, even Primakov presidency, policy would be likely to be more anti-Western than it was under Yeltsin - all the more so if the Duma elections yield a still more anti-Western parliament. And some of these presidential candidates may themselves be drifting from moderate nationalism to more radical nationalism in response to the current course of international events.[31]

Looking further down the line, Russia's foreign policy orientations could depend on the extent to which the authorities are able to stabilize the country's economic situation. There is no chance that Russia will experience an economic renaissance in the next ten years; the only question is whether Russians can engineer a new, low-level equilibrium that reduces the fragility of the financial system, its vulnerability to crashes, and the extent of misery experienced by 50 percent of the population. If the Russian government cannot do that much, then the situation could become all the more unpredictable. True, the combination of abject weakness and chronic instability could leave decision-makers in a sobered state of mind, totally preoccupied with domestic problems, and ever-more-eager to avoid adventurism or alienate potential sources of capital abroad. But it could equally - or more so, if the instability is chronic - lead to a "snap", be it violent or electoral, that overthrows the liberal/moderate nationalist ruling coalition in favor of a radical-nationalist ascendancy. This is the scenario often referred to as Weimar Russia.

Weimar Russia?

This scenario, of course, opens up entirely new and unwelcome possibilities. This is not the place for a full discussion of the factors pushing for and against this eventuality. The debate over the tightness-of-fit of the Weimar analogy is heating up at the moment and has spawned some very interesting insights about both the similarities and the differences.[32] Ironically, part of the justification for NATO's expansion, and for its maintaining the capacity to revert very quickly to the posture of a defensive alliance, is precisely the possibility that Russia may succumb to a neo-fascist regime that may rebuild an absolutist Russian state and take out its aggressions on its neighbors. And yet, it is also the case that, *ceteris paribus*, the war in Yugoslavia and the prospect of additional waves of NATO expansion certainly increase the chances - by how much, nobody knows - of a radical-nationalist ascendancy in Russia.

The country would pay a heavy economic price for such an ascendancy. Hopes for debt rescheduling or relief, foreign loans, foreign direct investment, even the continuing cash flow from Western Europe for Russian sales of natural gas could be jeopardized or dashed. But, for radical nationalists, material values are less important than the advancement of national glory through domination, by whatever means. Radical nationalists display a greater willingness to act on their emotions and to exaggerate the country's potential capabilities. They typically rally constituents by scapegoating both the Western world and alleged enemies within, usually linking the two by claiming that internal and external enemies are working together to destroy the country.

At present, most radical nationalists in Russia appear to share with their moderate and liberal co-politicians an awareness of Russia's weakness and a squeamishness about adventurism in foreign relations.[33] But this can change, especially if a new generation of radical nationalists follows the neo-fascist path taken by Makashov, Barkashov, the Russian National Unity movement, and others. In some regions of Russia today (Krasnodar, Pskov, Orel), governments are in power that can be termed fascist and that justify themselves with fascistic themes. The open scapegoating of Jews has increased greatly since the economic crash of August 1998, replete with conspiratorial explanations for the suffering of the Russian people. We could hope that the sobering effect of nuclear weapons would dampen radical nationalists' enthusiasm for international adventurism. Thus, a pogrom mentality against ethnic minorities and liberals within Russia might substitute for the kind of overt external aggression of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese government in the 1930s. But there is also that intermediate category between the "domestic" and the "foreign"; Russians call it the "Near Abroad", which is where the Baltic states are located.

A radical-nationalist regime could more ambitiously reconcile the pogrom mentality with the fear of nuclear confrontation by cracking down simultaneously on internal enemies and on countries within the Near Abroad. The Baltic states would be relatively easy targets. We have seen in recent years that the Yeltsin administration has tried to mute domestic criticism from radical nationalists and communists by attempting to demonstrate that, even as NATO expansion has proceeded apace, so too has the level of integration among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The political union with Belarus has been pushed hard as have various forms of economic union with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and several other Commonwealth states. While CIS integration may be a value in and of itself, it is quite possible that it has become linked to the felt need for a consolidative response to NATO expansion. If this is the felt political need of a moderate regime that is trying to

reconcile a strategy of integration into the West with the competitive defense of its "national interests", imagine how much stronger could be the response of a regime of radical nationalists that cared little for East-West cooperation except in so far as it helped to manage the nuclear danger.

I am not in the business of attaching probability estimates to alternative scenarios; whether a fascist ascendancy in Russia is a 5 percent probability or a 50 percent probability over the next 10 to 15 years is unfathomable - and is probably the wrong question to ask. We can concede that it is *possible* and then suggest factors that might increase its level of probability by an indeterminate amount. That is the methodology I have employed in this article. It is difficult to deny, at a minimum, that NATO's expansion into the former Soviet Union increases that level of probability. Whether it is worth the heightened risk in light of the ostensible benefits of such expansion is another matter, on which I will not comment.

Feudalization

To this point, I have been writing about Russia as if it is governed by a ruling coalition that seeks to formulate policy in line with its preferences, perspectives, and perceptions, and as if that coalition has a functioning state at its disposal for the implementation of its policies. In discussing the Weimar scenario, we only need to substitute a different ideological orientation and to consider how it would define and pursue ideals and interests in the world. I have altered that image only to consider the possible sources of uncontrolled provocations that could lead to crises in Moscow's relations with the Baltic states, provocations resulting from unauthorized actions by subordinates in the chain of command.

But what if we bring this last image to the forefront and treat it as symptomatic of a more general problem: the fragmentation, corruption, and criminalization of the Russian state,[34] along with growing self-assertion by regional elites against the center? Put differently, and even more bluntly, what if we treat Russia's state as in collapse and Moscow's leaders, be they moderates *or radicals*, as incapable of reversing the condition? If such a condition lasts for an extended period of time - a decade, let us say - we may be justified in projecting a scenario that we could call "feudalization". Russia, in this scenario, continues a process of regional disintegration (even if this does not include formal secession by regions), with central power increasingly ephemeral or ineffectual, until the "country" resembles a very large number of neo-feudal baronies, analogous to Europe in the early middle ages.[35]

Presumably, even under these circumstances, the Foreign Ministry would continue to negotiate on behalf of the central government, but its capacity to deliver on agreements would depend on whether that government could collect taxes and enforce or coordinate those agreements within the country. The Defense Ministry might continue to exercise formal control of the armed forces and the nuclear weapons complex, but its capacity to raise, train, and organize an army or to protect against the spontaneous disappearance of nuclear materials and weapons would always be in question. The President might hold regular summits with foreign leaders, but his capacity to negotiate anything of importance, or his ability to deliver on promises, might be hostage to his relations with regional governors and their willingness and ability to mobilize and transfer resources.

The feudalization scenario has profound implications for international security, Russia's relations with Western Europe and the United States, and the future of the Baltic states. For a country such as Russia to be fragmented, with a collapsed state, for a long period of time could have major consequences for the construction and viability of bilateral and multilateral regimes to contain the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, to prevent environmental disasters, and to combat public health threats, international organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and more. In addition, the traditional state-to-state approach, whether bilateral or multilateral, would be confounded by the fact that power within Russia is dispersed among multiple regions and among formal governmental and non-governmental actors within regions. So with whom to negotiate? The international system, in both bilateral and multilateral forums, is structured to coordinate relations among central governments that are presumably able to speak for their countries. It is much less adept at reaching solutions to problems that require negotiations between governments, on the one hand, and subnational units, on the other. All these dilemmas would perhaps be of greatest frustration to the rich democracies of Western Europe and North America, who typically take the lead in attempts to construct multilateral regimes to combat transnational threats. Western Europe in particular is vulnerable to the consequences of outbreaks of such "bads". The United States is marginally more insulated from some of them, though the margin is decreasing and the US is a continuing target of terrorism and of rogue states that acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the Baltic states, feudalization of Russia might appear to have fewer disadvantages. To be sure, it would not eliminate provocations by uncontrolled security forces; indeed, it would eliminate a possible central restraint on their activities. But that center does not now have much restraining power in any case. To the extent that the Baltic states have more to fear from a strong central

government in Moscow, feudalization would reduce the credibility of Moscow's threats. Would those threats instead emanate from the feudal baronies of Russia's northwest region? Perhaps, if governors of those regions were inclined toward pushing around neighboring states, individually or in combination with other regions. But most of the contiguous regions of Russia are small, poor, and very badly managed. They could hardly assert themselves as independent actors in international relations, and presumably could easily be deterred by the threat that larger states in the vicinity would support the Baltic governments. The one exception to this rule is St. Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast' which, if it turned fascist and assertive, could make mischief for Baltic states. However, the economic cost of doing so, both in loss of broader European support and in the disruption of trade routes through the Baltic states, would be considerable.

Presumably, the Baltic states would be vulnerable to looming environmental, public health, and organized criminal threats emanating from Russia and would have a stake in finding ways to ameliorate them. Under conditions of feudalization, they would presumably seek to work with both European governments and the governments of whatever Russian regions have the capacity to make a difference.

Conclusion

Russian policy toward the Baltic states has been a function of its policy in Europe, and in East-West relations, more generally. And these are functions of what kind of orientation is ascendant in Moscow's foreign policy-making circles. Since 1993, the Yeltsin administration has pursued a hybrid policy that combines East-West collaboration with East-West competition, based on a coalition of liberal internationalists and moderate nationalists. Such a coalition yielded a relatively stable equilibrium in Russian policies toward the Baltic states. However, I have indicated a number of paths through which this equilibrium could be disrupted, even with a liberal/moderate-nationalist coalition in control of policy making, causing crises in both Russo-Baltic and East-West relations: assertiveness by private economic interests that influence governmental decisions; a felt need in Moscow for a scapegoat for foreign policy setbacks; the perverse side-effects of political competition; a breakdown of administrative controls; provocations by other leaders within the CIS; a breakdown of interethnic relations within the Baltic states, leading to a felt need for Russian intervention of some sort; a reaction against NATO's war in Yugoslavia; or the inclusion of Baltic states in NATO. In the worst case, the current coalition could be superseded by one dominated by aggressive radical

nationalists. To achieve their goals, such radical nationalists would have to devise a workable strategy for rebuilding the Russian state. Absent that strong a reaction, the current coalition of liberal internationalists and moderate nationalists could still seek to assert Russia's national interest in having a veto over the alliance choices of Baltic governments. Alternatively, the continuing disintegration of Russia into neo-feudal baronies could make Russian relations with Baltic states more a function of local politics in Russia's northwest region, as Moscow lost its capacity to conduct a foreign policy of any enforceable sort.

George W. Breslauer

University of California at Berkely
Department of Politica Science
CA 94720 (USA)
bresl@socrates.berkely.edu

Endnotes

[1] Chancellor's Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley. This is a revised version of a paper originally delivered at the conference, "EU Challenges, Baltic Dimensions", at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, January 22-23, 1999. The author is grateful to participants in the conference, as well as to Matthew Bencke, Hall Gardner, Robert Legvold, and Neil MacFarlane, for comments on the earlier version. I alone am responsible for the shortcomings of the final version.

[2] On "tendency analysis", see Franklyn Griffiths (1971) "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy Making", in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.) *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press; for an application to Soviet foreign policy, see Franklyn Griffiths (1972) *Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behavior Toward the United States*, PhD dissertation, Columbia University. For analyses of the competing intellectual frameworks in post-Soviet, Russian foreign policy, see Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light (1996) *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Especially chapter 2 (Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking"). See also Alexei Arbatov (1993) "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives", *International Security*, 18, 2; William Zimmerman (1994) "Markets, Democracy, and Russian Foreign Policy", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 10, 2, April-June; S. Neil MacFarlane (1994) "Russian Conceptions of Europe", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 10, 3, July-September; Andrei Kortunov, "Russia, the 'Near Abroad,' and the West", in Gail Lapidus (ed.) (1995) *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*, Boulder, CO, Westview; Vladimir Shlapentokh (1997) "How Russians Will See the Status of Their Country by the End of the Century", *Journal of Comunist Studies and Transition Politics*, 13, 3, September; Celeste Wallander (1998) "The Russian National Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis", *Policy Memo Series*, 30, Cambridge, MA, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, David Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, July 1998.

[3] William Zimmerman (1969) *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967*, Princeton, Princeton University Press; Griffiths, *Images, Politics, and Learning*, op. cit. (footnote 2); Margot Light (1988) *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*, Brighton; Robert Legvold (1991) "Soviet Learning in the 1980s" in George W. Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder CO, Westview; Archie Brown (1996) *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, chapter. 7.

[4] Ivar Neumann (1996) *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London, Routledge.

[5] "How Russians Will See...", (footnote 2).

[6] See Veljko Vujacic (1996) "Gennadiy Zyuganov and the 'Third Road'", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12, 2, April-June; Walter Laqueur (1993) *Black Hundred. The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia*. New York, Harper Collins.

[7] The surprising strength of the communist party and the neo-fascist party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the Duma elections of December 1993 and December 1995 strengthened their ability to put the Yeltsin government on the defensive; indeed, not unrelated, Yeltsin fired his liberal-internationalist foreign minister in January 1996; for further evidence of Yeltsin's efforts to avoid being isolated at an extreme of the political spectrum, see George W. Breslauer and Catherine Dale (1997) "Boris Yeltsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13, 4, October-December; most recently, during 1998-1999, the most reactionary forces within the red-brown coalition have publicly condemned Jews for the

problems Russia faces, sparking a heated debate in Moscow and elsewhere about the legal limits of free speech when it inflames interethnic hatreds.

[8] "How Russians Will See...", (footnote 2).

[9] Wallender, "The Russian National Security Concept" (footnote 2) refers to this tendency as "statist;" Light refers to it as "pragmatic nationalist" (Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking", in Malcolm, et al. *Internal Factors* [footnote. 2]).

[10] For an early analysis of these discussions, see Stephen Sestanovich (1994) "Russia Turns the Corner", *Foreign Affairs*, 73, 1, January-February.

[11] Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking" (footnote 9), pp. 51-52.

[12] Wallender, (footnote.2).

[13] See Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe* (footnote 6); MacFarlane, "Russian Conceptions of Europe" (footnote 2); Heinz Timmerman (1996) "Relations Between the EU and Russia: The Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 12, 2, June; Dimitrii Danilov (1998) "A Piece of the Partnership", *Transitions*, April.

[14] The combination of cooperative and competitive postures is quite different from what it was in Soviet days. At that time, the competitive was much stronger than the cooperative. See George W. Breslauer (1982) "Why Détente Failed" in Alexander George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry*, Boulder CO, Westview. Under Yeltsin, the balance of the mix is reversed, with the cooperative strand much stronger than the competitive.

[15] The Baltic states all refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and have gone furthest in redirecting their trade dependencies westward, while knocking most vigorously on the doors of the European Union and NATO for membership.

[16] On the European Union, see Timmerman, "Relations between...", (footnote 12); on NATO, the literature is voluminous; for a recent overview of the issue, see Jonathan Haslam (1998) "Russia's seat at the table: a place denied or a place delayed?" *International Affairs*, 74, 1, 1998.

[17] Zbigniew Brzezinski and F. Stephen Larrabee (1999) *U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe: Report of an Independent Task Force*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, p. 37.

[18] But for a complaint by the Latvian foreign minister that the present situation should not be treated as either normal, desirable, or stable, see Valdis Birkavs (1999) "Latvia Seeks to Reconcile the Past With a Multiethnic Future", *International Herald Tribune*, May 14, p. 9.

[19] On the magnitude of this trauma, see Anatol Lieven (1998) *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*, New Haven CT, Yale University Press.

[20] It is worth noting, however, that Russia's weakness has also served as a resource by which Moscow has secured cooperative engagement from the West. Precisely because the Russian state has been too weak to control or finance initiatives required to decommission nuclear warheads, destroy chemical weapons, prevent the theft of weapons of mass destruction, clean up environmental degradation that spans national borders, and combat other transnational threats, Russian policymakers have been able to induce or blackmail Western governments into paying the bill for such efforts. For an outstanding demonstration of this, see Robert Darst (1997) "Bribery and Blackmail in East-West Environmental Politics", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13, 1, January-March.

[21] Aleksandr Lebed (1995) *Za derzhavu obidno*, Moscow, Moskovskaya pravda, pp. 409-410; for Yeltsin's paraphrase, see *The New York Times*, March 30, 1996.

[22] Lebed, who was then Yeltsin's National Security Advisor, said during his visit to Brussels that "Whatever NATO decides, Russia is not going to go into hysterics". In discussing NATO-Russia negotiations, Lebed stated: "We propose that we should tackle all the problems coolly, on the basis of reason rather than emotion". Leaders including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, LDPR head Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Communist Party chairman Gennady Zyuganov criticized Lebed for talking tough in Russia but pandering to NATO in Belgium. Indeed, on his first day back in Russia, Lebed seemed to validate their claim, asking attendees at a conference, "Will NATO's expansion...boost Russia's security? Nobody can guarantee that it won't occur to someone...to do to us what was recently done to Iraq". Lebed was referring to US missile attacks on Iraqi targets. Less than a week after his return from Brussels, Yeltsin fired Lebed. For the above quotes, see Neil Buckley, "Lebed Seeks Pact with NATO", *The Financial Times*, October 8, 1996, p. 2; "Lebed's NATO Broadside", *The Independent* (London), October 11, 1996, p. 15.

[23] Brzezinski and Larrabee, *U.S. Policy* (footnote 16), p. 37.

[24] Richard Ned Lebow (1981) *Between War and Peace: The Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.

[25] See George W. Breslauer (1996) "Yeltsin's Political Leadership: Why Invade Chechnya?" in George W. Breslauer et al., *Russia: Political and Economic Development*, Claremont CA, The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies; Emil A. Payin and Arkady A. Popov (1996) "Chechnya", in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, (eds.) *U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force*, Santa Monica CA, The Rand Corporation, pp. 25-26; Valery Tishkov (1997) *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union*, London, Sage Publications, p. 218.

[26] As Danilov cogently puts the point, "The broad consensus in favor of EU expansion matches the unanimity of Russia's political establishment in rejecting NATO enlargement" ("A Piece of the Partnership" [footnote. 13], p. 61.

[27] Nikolai Sokov (1998) "Russia's Relations with NATO: Lessons from the History of the Entente Cordiale", *Policy Memo Series*, 29, Cambridge MA, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Davis Center, Harvard University, July, p. 2.

[28] For innovative proposals on how to restructure NATO to include Russia in its decision making, see Hall Gardner (1997) *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO*, Westport CT, Praeger; Hall Gardner (1999) "NATO Enlargement: Toward a Separate Euro-Atlantic Command", Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, internet edition, January 30; Ira Straus (1999) "NATO's problem of decision-making - and General Marshall's Solution", internet edition, April .

[29] Brzezinski and Larrabee, *U.S. Policy* (footnote 16), p. 38.

[30] See the proposals in Gardner (footnote 24).

[31] In recent years, Luzhkov's public rhetoric in particular has gravitated toward radical nationalism vis-à-vis the Near Abroad. Zyuganov's rhetoric has always been radical-nationalist. Lebed's has alternated between moderate and radical nationalism, with the latter becoming more pronounced during the past two years.

[32] See, for a sampling, Alexander Yanov (1995) *Weimar Russia and What We Can Do About It*, New York, Slovo-Word Publishing House; Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein (1997) "The Weimar/Russia Comparison", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13, 3, July-September; critique by Stephen D. Shenfield (1997) in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13, 4, October-December, and rejoinder by Kopstein and Hanson, *Ibid.*

[33] This was one of the findings of Shlapentokh's surveys ("How Russians Will See..." [footnote. 2]).

[34] See the issue of the journal *Demokratizatsiya*. 6, 3, Summer 1998, which is devoted entirely to this theme and its implications.

[35] See Vladimir Shlapentokh (1996) "Early Feudalism – The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, 3, May.

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